Experimental Order and Sample Demographics
In the text we present results from five survey experiments: the Justification experiment; the Two Presidencies experiment; the Partisan Source experiment; the Student Loans experiment and the Immigration experiment. Three of these experiments (Justification; Partisan Source; Student Loans) were embedded on the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, which was administered in two waves before and after the November 2014 midterm elections. The CCES is a national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix (for more information on the CCES, see: http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces/home). The Student Loans experiment was embedded on the pre-election wave and was administered to all 1,000 subjects assigned to our team module (996 completed the experiment). Of the 1,000 subjects originally assigned to our module, 889 were successfully re-contacted and participated in the post-election wave. Both the Justification experiment and the Partisan Source experiment were embedded on the post-election wave. To prevent possible spillover effects, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental modules. As a result, 440 subjects completed the Justification experiment and 445 subjects completed the Partisan Source experiment.
To complement the three experiments embedded on the 2014 CCES, we embedded two additional experiments on two separate follow-up surveys fielded by YouGov with nationally representative samples (for more information on YouGov's sampling process, see:
https://today.yougov.com/about/about-the-yougov-panel/). The first survey containing the Two Presidencies experiment was fielded by YouGov between April 16-18, 2015. All 1,000 subjects in this survey were assigned to and completed the Two Presidencies experiment. The second survey containing the Immigration experiment was fielded by YouGov between April 24-28, 2015 . Approximately half of the 1,000 subjects on this follow-up survey were randomly assigned to the Immigration experiment; 486 subjects completed the experiment. The demographic composition of all three survey samples are summarized in SI Table 1 .
Additional Motivation for Partisan and Policy Hypotheses
In the text, we argue that partisan forces and policy preferences may shape how Americans assess unilateral action. We find that both of these forces plainly shape how political elites respond to unilateral action. Here we provide additional motivation for the partisan and policy hypotheses by examining the influence of both factors on how elites respond to unilateral action.
Unsurprisingly, elite responses to unilateral action often fall along partisan lines. Perhaps most famously, candidate Barack Obama railed against the excessive unilateralism of President Bush in 2007. "I taught constitutional law for 10 years. I take the Constitution very seriously.
The biggest problems that we're facing right now have to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all. And that is what I intend to reverse when I become president of the United States." 
Constructing our Dependent Variables
Complete question wordings for all five experiments are presented in SI Appendix 1. For four of our five experiments, the dependent variable was measured as the degree of support for unilateral action on a four-point likert scale. To guard against satisficing we followed recommended practice to exclude the middle or neutral category.
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Because the media often reports the simple percentage supporting a policy or approving of a politician's course of action, we collapse the strongly support and somewhat support categories to identify subjects who support unilateral action. In the tables below, we present the percentage of subjects supporting unilateral action in each treatment group in each experiment. In the article text, we construct logistic regression models with this binary dummy variable identifying those who support unilateral action as the dependent variable. Ordered logistic regressions using the full four-point likert scale as the dependent variable yield substantively similar results.
As shown in SI Appendix 1, the Partisan Source experiment used a different question format for the dependent variable. This question, adapted from a June 2006 Gallup poll (USGALLUP.200621.Q11), asked subjects whether the president in question has "gone too far, has been about right, or has not gone far enough -in expanding the power of the presidency and executive branch to combat terrorism." For this experiment, in the tables below we present the percentage of subjects replying that the president has "gone too far" across the two treatment groups. In the article text, we construct a binary dependent variable coded 1 for those who said the president has "gone too far" and 0 otherwise. We then use logistic regression.
Difference in Means Tests for Each Experiment
In the article, we report results from logistic regressions that assess the influence of each experimental treatment (and that interaction of that treatment with partisan and policy/selfinterest variables) on support for unilateral action while controlling for each subject's demographic characteristics. However, because subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, as an initial assessment for each treatment's influence on support for unilateral action we can simply compare the mean levels of support observed across treatment and control groups in each experiment. SI Tables 2-6 present difference of means tests for each of the five experiments. Results mirror those obtained from the logistic regressions presented and discussed in the text.
Robustness Checks on Justification Module
In the Justification experiment, we found that independents who are not affiliated with either the Democratic or Republican parties were much more likely to support presidents taking unilateral action to pursue their policy objectives when such action is justified as a response to congressional obstruction. In the models in the text, we treated subjects who "leaned" toward either party as partisans. Here, we show that the results are robust to treating "leaners" as independents.
SI Table 7 replicates the simple difference in means analysis presented in SI Table 2, but treats "leaners" as independents. Results are virtually identical. The justification treatment did not increase support for unilateral action among Democrats and Republicans, but it did among independents (54% in the treatment vs. 32% in the control).
In model 1 of SI Table 8 , we replicate the analysis from the text, but treat "leaners" as independents. Results are virtually identical. For independents identified via this broader definition, the congressional obstruction justification significantly increased support for presidential unilateral action. However, for both Democrats and Republicans the justification had no effect. The interactions are negative, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than the main effect. Model 2 of SI Table 8 replicates the analysis conducted in model 1, but it drops the nineteen subjects who were "not sure" of their partisan identification from the analysis.
Results are virtually identical to those in model 1. Finally, model 3 replicates the analysis from the text (i.e. it includes leaners as partisans), but it drops the nineteen subjects who were "not sure" of their partisan identification. Results are virtually identical to those presented in the text and to those in models 1 and 2. The congressional obstruction justification increase support for unilateral action among independents; however, it had little effect on support for unilateral action among Democratic or Republican respondents.
Controlling for Presidential Approval
In each of our experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The main advantage of a randomized experiment is the causal leverage it affords.
Randomization helps balance confounders (both observed and unobserved) across groups, which allows us to attribute differences across groups to the experimental treatments and to reduce the potential for omitted variable bias in the model results. Even given the obvious benefits of such a design, as a final robustness check for the three experiments embedded on the 2014 CCES we re-estimate our analyses controlling for whether or not each subject approved or disapproved of President Obama's job performance, (a question which was included on the common content of the pre-election wave). SI Tables 9-11 re-estimate Tables 1, 3 , and 4 from the text while also controlling for presidential approval. All results remain unchanged. Finally, the last model in SI Tables 9-11 interacts the experimental treatment variable with the presidential approval indicator. We find no evidence that the justification treatment affected support for unilateral action among those who did (or did not) approve of Obama's job performance (SI Table 9 ). Consistent with our results for partisanship, in SI Table 10 we see that the Bush treatment significantly increased the probability of a subject who approved of Obama believing that the president (i.e. Bush) had gone too far in expanding presidential power in the context of the war on terror. Finally, we found no evidence in the Student Loan experiment that the executive order treatment affected support for the president's action among approvers or non-approvers.
Political Knowledge as a Potential Moderating Factor
Across multiple tests and multiple experiments examined in the text, we found little evidence that constitutional concerns significantly influenced how Americans evaluate unilateral action. However, it is possible that only the most politically knowledgeable Americans evaluate unilateral action in part through its constitutional implications for our system of checks and balances. To test this hypothesis, we used a series of six questions on the 2014 CCES that afford a measure of political knowledge. These questions include knowledge of which party controlled the U.S. House of Representatives; which party controlled the U.S. Senate; and the partisan affiliation of each subject's home state governor, two U.S. Senators, and local representative in the U.S. House. 4 The Justification experiment provides an initial test of this hypothesis. Because the Justification treatment explicitly reminds subjects that President Obama is acting unilaterally 4 There were no other factual knowledge questions in the common content of the surveys. While greater variance in the kinds of political knowledge questions would have been preferable (see, e.g., Luskin, Robert. 1987 because Congress has chosen not to act (and that he is not acting, for example, pursuant to power delegated to him by the legislature), the treatment directly raises concerns about checks and balances. In the sample as a whole, we found no evidence that the justification treatment lowered support for unilateral action (Table 1) . To examine whether the effect of the treatment is moderated by subjects' political knowledge, we replicated the baseline model from Table 1 with our political knowledge measure and its interaction with the variable indicating assignment to the justification treatment. SI Table 12 presents the results. The coefficients for both the justification treatment and its interaction with political knowledge are small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on the un-interacted, main effect political knowledge variable is also small and statistically insignificant. Thus, we find no evidence that politically knowledgeable subjects were more or less supportive of unilateral action, on average, than their less knowledgeable peers. We also find no evidence that politically knowledgeable subjects responded differently to the justification treatment.
The Student Loans experiment may provide an even cleaner test. In the text, we show that whether Obama pursued his policy through a legislative path versus a unilateral one had no discernible effect on public support for his actions. Rather, partisanship and policy preferences governed the calculation. This result cut against the hypothesis that the public is inherently skeptical of unilateral action as a strategy for presidents to accomplish their policy objectives.
However, it is possible that politically knowledgeable subjects might be less supportive of Obama's course when he pursues his policy unilaterally than when he pursues the same policy legislatively. To test this hypothesis, SI Table 13 replicates the baseline analysis from Table 4 in the text, but again includes both the measure of political knowledge and its interaction with the executive order treatment indicator variable. We find no evidence that political knowledge moderates the influence of the executive order treatment. The coefficient on the interaction variable is very small and statistically insignificant. The coefficient for the main treatment effect also remains statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient for the political knowledge variable itself is also small and statistically insignificant.
To ensure that the null results on political knowledge were consistent we examined its psychometric properties and tried alternative constructions. Principal component analysis (unrotated) shows that the eigenvalues load at 57% on one component and over 70% on two components; a scree plot of the eigenvalues suggests two components. The first two measureswho controls the House and Senate-appear more distinct from the others, loading at .61 and .56 on the second component, with all the others loading more heavily on the first. As these questions are about federal as opposed to state considerations, the dimensions might be drawn here. We therefore created two new measures of political information, the first with the two federal questions and the second with the state questions, and entered them into our models as we have done with the more comprehensive index above-i.e., both directly and as moderators of the treatment effects. In no case did the results achieve statistical significance for either the direct or moderating variables. We similarly constructed two principal component scores and entered them into our models as both direct and treatment moderating variables. Again, all results were insignificant. In all, we found consistent evidence that the null results on the treatments are generalizable across the range of political knowledge.
Proxies for Policy Preferences
The Student Loans experiment and Immigration experiment test our hypothesis that Americans evaluate unilateral action according to whether it accords with their policy preferences. To measure subjects' policy preferences on these issues we use two proxies. In the first experiment, we use subjects' answer to a question embedded earlier on the survey asking whether they or anyone in their family had student loan debt. Subjects who replied yes to this question stand to benefit materially from governmental action to cap student loan payments in a way that subjects who do not have student loan debt will not. As a result, we argue that these subjects are more likely, on average, to have strong predispositions to support a policy that caps student loan payments. In the second experiment, we use a dummy variable identifying Latinos as a proxy for underlying support for policies that would liberalize immigration. Recent survey evidence consistently shows that Latinos are significantly more supportive of immigration liberalization than non-Latinos.
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Both measures are imperfect proxies for policy preferences.
However, they are both more nuanced than the approach taken by most prior assessments of the influence of policy preferences on opinion formation, which uses party id as a proxy for policy preferences and then examines whether Democrats/Republicans respond to liberal/conservative issue positions on issues such as Medicaid spending and abortion. 
Sources for Discussion
In the concluding section of the article, we mention several cases in which public opinion was aligned solidly against presidential unilateral action. For example, as Congress debated and 
20% (148) 79% (227) 45% (108) Note: None of the differences in means across the Domestic Policy and Foreign Policy treatment groups are statistically significant. 
SI
44% (157) 91% (228) 66% (118) 90% (138) 63% (355) Note: None of the differences in means across the treatment (executive order) and control (law) groups are statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed test). 
Executive order 46% (232) 9% (68) 76% (102) 37% (62) 65% (23) 44% (209) Note: None of the differences in means across the treatment (executive order) and control (law) groups are statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed test). Note: Model 1 treats "leaners" as independents. Model 2 drops the 19 subjects who were "not sure" of their partisan identification. Model 3 drops subjects "not sure" of their partisan identification and treats "leaners" as partisans. Models are logistic regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 

SI Appendix 1 Justification Experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups. All subjects were then asked the same question.
Control:
President Obama has aggressively used unilateral executive power to pursue his priorities in both foreign and domestic policy.
Treatment:
The current Congress has been one of the most obstructionist on record and is near historic lows in terms of its legislative productivity. Congress has failed to act on many of the most important issues facing the country.
As a result of this congressional inaction, President Obama has aggressively used unilateral executive power to pursue his priorities in both foreign and domestic policy.
Question:
Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive order to accomplish their administrations' goals. Do you support or oppose this approach?
Strongly support Somewhat support Somewhat oppose Strongly oppose
Two Presidencies Experiment
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups.
Domestic Policy Treatment:
Presidents have the power in some cases to bypass Congress and take action by executive order to accomplish their administrations' goals. 
Means vs. Ends Experiment: Student Loans
Legislation Treatment:
President Barack Obama has publicly backed legislation in Congress that would cap student loan payments at 10% of a borrower's income, and forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.
Executive Order Treatment:
President Barack Obama has issued an executive order to unilaterally cap student loan payments at 10% of a borrower's income, and forgive any remaining debt after 20 years.
Question:
Do you support or oppose President Obama's efforts to lower student loan payments?
